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A udit failure and corporate corruption
Why Mediterranean patron-client relations are relevant 
for understanding the work of international accountancy fi rms
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Abstract: Patron-clientelism and corruption were traditionally viewed as prob-
lems endemic to underdeveloped marginal countries with weak states, powerful 
self-serving elites, and widespread civic disengagement. However, recent decades 
have seen a dramatic increase in corruption scandals in the Global North, partic-
ularly its more developed banking and fi nancial sectors. Paradoxically, this has oc-
curred despite a massive expansion in auditing by international accountancy fi rms 
(KPMG, PwC, Deloitte, EY) who oft en portray themselves as warriors of integrity, 
transparency, and ethical conduct. How are these trends connected? Drawing on 
anthropological studies of Mediterranean patron-clientelism, I illustrate how col-
lusive relations between accountancy fi rms and their clients create ideal conditions 
for corruption to fl ourish. Finally, I ask how can these accountancy scandals help 
us rethink patron-clientelism in an age of “audit culture”?
Keywords: accountancy scandals, audit culture, Big Four, fraud and corruption, 
Mediterranean anthropology, patron-client relations.
Th is article starts from a puzzle. Patron-clien-
telism and corruption were traditionally identi-
fi ed by academics and policy makers as prob-
lems endemic to marginal, underdeveloped or 
developing countries characterized by weak 
states, powerful self-serving elites, civic disen-
gagement, and a pervasive ethos of interfamily 
hostility and mistrust—what Edward Banfi eld 
(1967) famously termed “amoral familism.” 
Narratives about patronage and corruption typ-
ically pitted the backwardness of “transitional” 
economies in the semi-peripheries and Global 
South against the more enlightened values of 
fairness, openness, and transparency found in 
the more industrialized and modernized soci-
eties of the West (Gellner and Waterbury 1977; 
Rose-Ackerman and Palifk a 2016; Shore and 
Haller 2005; Silverman 1965). Yet recent de-
cades have seen dramatic increases in fraud and 
corruption scandals in the Global North, partic-
ularly in its more developed commercial, bank-
ing, and fi nancial sectors. Since the 2008 global 
fi nancial crisis, an event triggered by corporate 
greed, poor governance, complacent regulators, 
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and reckless risk-taking by the banks (which had 
to be bailed out by massive public funds1), there 
has been a continuous spate of high-profi le fraud 
and corruption scandals. Th ese include carteliza-
tion, insider trading, money laundering, sanc-
tion-busting, the fi xing of the London Interbank 
Off ered Rate (LIBOR), and intricate tax-avoid-
ance schemes for the super-rich revealed in the 
2015 leaked Panama Papers (Tombs 2015) and 
the 2017 Paradise Papers. As David Whyte ar-
gues (2015: 5), we seem to have entered an “era 
of ‘turbo corruption’” in which fraud and cor-
ruption have become normalized routine prac-
tices for maintaining the power of corporations, 
governments, and public institutions.
Paradoxically, these developments have oc-
curred during a period of massive expansion 
in company auditing by accredited professional 
accountancy fi rms whose job is to regulate 
company fi nances in order to prevent fraud and 
give investors confi dence that the companies 
are not involved in chicanery. Th is growth in 
accountancy is particularly striking in the UK. 
Prem Sikka, writing a decade ago, noted that 
while the number of family doctors in the UK 
was 50,000, there were over 280,000 profes-
sional accountants, “more than the rest of the 
European Union put together” and “almost the 
highest number of accountants per capita in 
the world” (Sikka 2009). By 2018, that number 
had grown to over 360,000, plus an additional 
168,000 accountancy students (Financial Re-
porting Council 2018: 4–5). Yet this dramatic 
expansion in auditing seems to have done little 
to prevent corporate corruption or stem audit 
failure. Th e global auditing market is dominated 
by four international accountancy fi rms known 
collectively as the “Big Four”: Ernst and Young 
(EY), PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), Deloitte, 
and KPMG (based on the names of the found-
ers Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler). Each of 
these fi rms has been embroiled in serious fraud 
and professional misconduct resulting in fi nes 
and even prison sentences for some partners. 
Th ese controversies raise four key questions 
about the relationship between corruption, ac-
counting, and society that I seek to examine: 
(1) what is the link between the growth of ac-
counting and rising levels of corruption?, (2) 
Why have these fi nancial watchdogs repeatedly 
failed to detect fraud and what do these regula-
tory failures reveal about the nature of contem-
porary corruption?, (3) How are perceptions 
of rising levels of corporate corruption linked 
to the neoliberalization of economy and so-
ciety?, and (4) what insight does the legacy of 
Mediterranean anthropology off er for under-
standing contemporary patronage and corrup-
tion beyond the Mediterranean, particularly in 
the heartlands of fi nancial capitalism? To an-
swer these questions, I begin by outlining the 
methodological contribution of Mediterranean 
anthropology to the study of patronage and cor-
ruption before turning to examine the activities 
of the Big Four accountancy fi rms and the ques-
tions these raise concerning fraud and corrup-
tion. In bringing together these themes, I hope 
to demonstrate why anthropological debates on 
patron-clientelism can help us understand cor-
ruption scandals involving the Big Four accoun-
tancy fi rms. What we see here are new forms 
of collusion borne of clientelistic relationships 
between accountancy fi rms and the companies 
they audit, and oft en involving the government 
bodies that are supposed to regulate the audi-
tors. I ask: to what extent does the belief that the 
fi nancial sector can regulate itself or that these 
fi rms are “too big to fail” refl ect a similar brack-
eting of the powerful as symbolically “outside” 
the boundaries of the moral community? Does 
their dominant market position render these 
fi rms immune from the norms and rules that 
apply elsewhere, in much the same way as the 
traditional elites who featured in early Mediter-
ranean ethnography were oft en situated “above” 
the normative frameworks governing everyday 
life at the local level? 
Patron-client relations in the 
anthropology of the Mediterranean
Th e themes of patronage and clientelism had a 
particular salience in the anthropology of the 
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Mediterranean (Davis 1977; Gilmore 1982). 
Early ethnographic accounts of Mediterranean 
societies, prompted by a methodological shift  
away from structural-functionalism toward 
more actor-centered approaches, highlighted 
the importance of studying middlemen, bro-
kers, entrepreneurs, networks, parties, cliques, 
and factions rather than the traditional anthro-
pological focus on corporate lineage groups 
(Bailey 1971; Blok 1975; Boissevain 1974). Th ey 
also emphasized the importance of studying so-
cial institutions such as patronage, spiritual kin-
ship and friendship, and forms of association 
based on neighborhoods and voluntary interest 
groups. Th e patron-client relationship was iden-
tifi ed as a key feature of traditional Mediterra-
nean and peasant societies and what Eric Wolf 
(1966) famously termed the “interstitial, com-
plementary and parallel structures of complex 
society.” Sydel Silverman best captured the de-
fi ning elements of that relationship: Patronage, 
she wrote,
may be defi ned as an informal contractual 
relationship between persons of unequal 
status and power, which imposes recip-
rocal obligations of a diff erent kind on 
each of the parties. As a minimum, what 
is owed is protections and favour on the 
one hand and loyalty on the other. Th e 
relationship is on a personal, face-to-face 
basis, and it is a continuing one. (Silver-
man 1965: 176)
What interested the pioneers of Mediter-
ranean anthropology was precisely the moral 
quality of these personal contractual relation-
ships (Campbell 1966; Kenny 1968; Pitt-Rivers 
1961). Th is typically entailed villagers, peasants, 
shepherds, and other lower-status or subordi-
nate groups giving services and political support 
to their higher-status patrons (who included lo-
cal mayors, landlords, priests, merchants, doc-
tors, and other members of the local elite) in 
return for small favors, political protection, and 
support in dealing with the world beyond the 
village or local community. Although these rela-
tionships were clearly unequal and hierarchical, 
they were also seen as moral, multi-stranded, 
and framed in terms of idioms of kinship or 
friendship. It was this ethical and “multiplex” 
(Bailey 1971) character of the patron-client re-
lationship that became the focus of anthropo-
logical interest. As many ethnographies noted, 
it was usually the peasant or supplicant—not 
the powerful landlord or mayor—who would 
seek to create the patron-client bond. Draw-
ing a powerful magnate into a more personal 
relationship was a “weapon of the weak” (Scott 
1985) and an investment strategy; it was a way 
of controlling the “autocracy of local magnates” 
(Davis 1977: 135) and creating more binding 
moral ties the subaltern partner could exploit 
for strategic familial advantage. 
Most patronage relationships involved in-
dividuals rather than groups. Typically, men 
would be clients to those above them, while si-
multaneously patronizing their social inferiors. 
What these early anthropologists saw, therefore, 
were a series of interpersonal ties (or “dyadic” 
bonds), which, when seen as a whole, formed 
chains or networks linking the rural hinterland 
to the metropolitan centers. From this perspec-
tive, local patrons came to be defi ned by Silver-
man (1965) and others as “community-nation 
mediators.” Patrons were “middlemen” or cul-
tural brokers who straddled the urban-rural 
divide: individuals who supposedly helped to 
“bridge the gap” between core and periphery, or 
what Robert Redfi eld (1956) called the “Great” 
and “Little Traditions”—so that isolated rural 
communities might gain access to the benefi ts 
and resources of the state.
Mediterranean rural societies were also 
portrayed as being marked by a strong ethos 
of egalitarianism, a gender-infl ected ideology 
sometimes captured in local sayings such as “all 
men are equal here,” or the Kabyle male maxim, 
“I also have a moustache” (Peristiany 1965: 9). 
When asked about these patronage relations, 
Mediterranean countrymen typically described 
them as an extension of “friendship” and “kin-
ship,” or as a spiritual relationship, describ-
ing the patron as “my friend,” or “godfather” 
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(padrino, compadre, Koumbaros) to our child. 
Taking their cue from their informants, many 
anthropologists used similar interpretations 
in their ethnographies. “Lop-sided friendship” 
and “reciprocal but unequal” was how Julian 
Pitt-Rivers (1961: 140) famously portrayed the 
patron-client relationship in his pioneering eth-
nography of a small Spanish town. Th e chains 
created by these patronage ties were variously 
described as “informal groups,” “action sets,” 
“friends of friends,” “kinship networks,” and 
“amigocracies” (Boissevain 1974).
I cite these examples because they illustrate 
some of the wider themes of Mediteranneanist 
anthropology and their relevance to the study 
of contemporary corruption, particularly argu-
ments about ideology and the limits of ethnog-
raphy and why anthropological analysis needs 
to go beyond ethnographic description and ac-
counts of the folk model. Early Mediterranean-
ist anthropologists, particularly those working 
in the structural-functionalist approach with 
its characteristically ahistorical and consensus 
model of society, oft en failed to do this. Th eir 
analytical shortcoming arose not so much from 
ethnocentrism, but from displaced or “second-
ary ethnocentrism.” Th is happens when an-
thropologists—whose disciplinary formation 
already inclines them toward empiricism, hu-
manism, and cultural relativism—uncritically 
adopt the point of view of their informants, and 
to such a degree that local explanations of re-
ality are regarded as somehow less biased and 
closer to the anthropological “truth.” In the case 
of Mediterranean patronage, this made it dif-
fi cult for some ethnographers to see that what 
they were looking at was not just so many in-
dividual ties or “dyadic bonds” linked together 
in a loose chain, but unequal power relations of 
an historical and structural nature. It was only 
when looked at from a materialist or political 
economy perspective that it became possible to 
diagnose these relationships as class relation-
ships and to see that ties of “spiritual kinship” 
and “friendship” were simply idioms of stratifi -
cation used to disguise or ameliorate what were, 
in eff ect, relationships of domination and sub-
ordination (Colclough 1971; Davis 1977: 132; Li 
Causi 1975). 
Th e point here is that the discourse of 
“honor,” “friendship,” and “interpersonal ties” 
around which patronage-clientelism was framed, 
worked to conceal rather than illuminate the 
class nature of these relationships. Yet most an-
thropologists, blinded by what they saw as the 
voluntary, contractual, and moral quality of a 
patron-client relation, failed to see it as a form 
of class domination. 
Understanding contemporary 
corruption: Insights from 
Mediterraneanist anthropology 
Th ere are at least four points of wider anthropo-
logical and analytical signifi cance to be gleaned 
from this brief account of competing interpreta-
tions of Mediterranean patronage: 
1.  Morality: patron-clientelism entailed a 
form of complicity and collusion between 
the two parties that had its own moral-
ity, at least from an insider or emic per-
spective. Th e relationship was informal, 
contractual and personal: an exchange of 
loyalty, favors, and service for protection. 
2.  Political Economy: Th e patron-client tie 
formed part of a wider political economy 
of clientelism based on historical relations 
of production, a set of values, and an ide-
ology of paternalism and patriarchy that 
connected with local notions of honor, 
family, and patronage.
3.  Class Power: Viewed from a political 
economy perspective, patronage-clientel-
ism constituted a system of stratifi cation 
and a form of class power; a hierarchical 
order of domination and subordination 
that served to maintain the economic 
interests and social exclusivity of a dom-
inant elite. 
4.  Scalar Dimensions: Th e patron-client 
system was based on vertical rather than 
horizontal bonds that straddled diff erent 
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geographical locations; patrons were of-
ten situated beyond the village or neigh-
borhood community and therefore not 
bound by the same moral codes and 
standards. A form of complicity and col-
lusion operated that further reinforced 
the exclusivity of an elite that saw itself 
as part of an honored society and exempt 
from normal rules—an elite that was also 
highly successful in naturalizing a sense 
of distinction and deserved privilege. One 
of the important lessons from Mediterra-
nean ethnography was that social rela-
tions can be both intimate and personal 
and at the same time exploitative and hi-
erarchical. How we defi ne relationships 
therefore shapes how we understand and 
theorize them. Th is may seem an obvi-
ous epistemological point, but it is worth 
reiterating: defi nitions open up ways of 
seeing, but also ways of not seeing; of con-
cealment and mis-recognition.
As I illustrate below, these four themes of 
morality, political economy, class power and 
scalar relations provide a particularly useful 
lens for exploring contemporary forms of pa-
tron clientelism and corruption in the world of 
fi nancial accounting.
Defi ning corruption: Beyond 
“abuse of public offi  ce”
Th e fi rst point to emphasize is that the standard 
defi nition of corruption is partial and problem-
atic. According to the World Bank and other 
international organizations, corruption (which 
includes nepotism, clientelism, and bribery) 
is “the abuse of public offi  ce for private gain” 
(World Bank 1997: 8).2 Th e problem with this 
defi nition is that it limits corruption proper 
to the public sector. Typically, corruption was 
thought to arise from a combination of weak 
governance and greedy individuals, the result 
of institutional capture or rent-seeking, which 
occurs when shady offi  cials divert public fund-
ing programs from their intended recipients. 
Th is conception reinforced the idea that the 
solution to corruption is privatization and the 
introduction of competition through outsourc-
ing and internal markets. Th e assumption was 
that a functioning, competitive economy based 
on free-market principles rules out the possi-
bility of corruption. Th e result was a series of 
counter-corruption policies led by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, World Bank, and United 
Nations Development Programme based on 
structural adjustment policies that encouraged 
market reforms and a retreat from state regu-
lation. As Naomi Klein (2007) observed in Th e 
Shock Doctrine, one of the clearest illustrations 
of how these ideas were translated into policy 
and practice was the reconstruction that took 
place in Iraq following the 2003 Gulf War (see 
also Harvey 2007: 6–7). As with similar shock 
therapy experiments in Chile and Indonesia, 
opening the public sector to predatory fi nance 
capitalism not only worked to massively trans-
fer wealth from the populace to corporate elites 
fi nancing the reconstruction programs, it also 
increased the scope and opportunities for cor-
ruption in the emerging risk, insurance, fi -
nancial advisory, and futures markets. Th is is 
arguably one of the defi ning features of patron-
age in the corporate world; its close association 
with the “new economy” of contemporary fi -
nance capitalism (Gledhill 2003; J. Schneider 
and P. Schneider 2003b). Like patron-client 
relations in traditional Mediterranean societies, 
the corporate world has naturalized its own sys-
tem of privilege, hierarchy, and power.
One consequence of the World Bank and 
OECD’s extensive 1980s privatization programs 
was an increasing blurring of the boundaries 
between the public and the private spheres. Th is 
has major implications for the rules and ethics 
governing public offi  cials (more on this and 
“revolving-door” appointments later). Neoliberal 
policies have actively encouraged the incursion 
of private wealth accumulation into the public 
sphere and weakened government regulation 
of the fi nancial sector. In the United States and 
the UK, these reforms have produced a complex 
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web of relationships that have enabled corporate 
and fi nancial power to merge into the state. As 
David Whyte (2015: 11) notes, “understanding 
contemporary corruption must therefore start 
with an understanding of what has changed in the 
relationship between the ‘public’ and ‘private.’”
Two things in particular changed following 
the post-1980s neoliberal policy reforms. Th e 
fi rst was the massive opening up of the public 
sector to the predatory practices of corporate 
fi nance capital. Th is happened in several ways, 
including deregulation, competitive tendering, 
compulsory outsourcing, and introduction of 
various new Private Finance Initiatives (PFIs) 
and Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), which 
fi scally conservative governments then used 
to fund major public building programs such 
as hospitals, prisons, bridges, and roads with-
out the costs appearing on their balance sheets 
(Monbiot 2000). Th e second was the introduc-
tion of legislation in the UK and elsewhere to 
make compulsory auditing of all private and 
public-sector companies, including schools, 
hospitals, housing associations, universities, 
charities, and other entities, created a vast state-
guaranteed market for professional auditing 
services, which greatly helped the Big Four ac-
countancy fi rms grow (Sikka 2004). 
Evolution of the Big Four: From audit 
fi rms to fi nancial services agencies
It is against this background that the Big Four 
accountancy fi rms have risen to their position 
of global prominence. For much of the twen-
tieth century the international accountancy 
industry was dominated by a group of fi rms 
known as the Big Eight, which included Arthur 
Anderson, Arthur Young & Co., Coopers & Ly-
brand, Deloitte Haskins & Sells, Ernst & Whin-
ney, Peat Marwick Mitchell, Price Waterhouse, 
and Touche Ross. However, through a series 
acquisitions and mergers during the 1980s, the 
Big Eight were reduced to the Big Five and fol-
lowing the Enron scandal and the break-up of 
Arthur Andersen became the Big Four. Th ese 
fi rms dominate the market in company audit-
ing and have become indispensable to that mar-
ket as they are the only fi rms equipped to audit 
large multinational companies. Between them, 
the Big Four operate across 150 countries, em-
ploy well over a million staff  worldwide (Statista 
2019a), and in 2014 alone, generated US$113.7 
billion in global revenues (Doherty 2014). 
Th eir combined revenues have risen annually 
since 2014: from US$128 billion in 2016 and 
US$134.28 billion in 2017 to US$154.75 billion 
in 2019 (Statista 2018a; 2018b; 2019b). Even the 
smallest of the Big Four, KPMG, is larger than 
the next four accounting fi rms combined (Econ-
omist 2014). Since the 2008 global fi nancial cri-
sis, they have steadily increased their grip over 
the global accounting, tax preparation, book-
keeping, and payroll services industry. In 2011, 
they audited over 80 percent of all public com-
panies in Japan and 97 percent of all US public 
companies with sales between US$250 million 
and US$5 billion (Pai and Tolleson 2012: 85). In 
2015, Deloitte, EY, PwC and KPMG collectively 
audited 79 percent of all UK main market-listed 
companies, more than 96 percent of the FTSE 
250 companies, and 99 percent of the FTSE 100, 
the UK’s 100 largest public companies (Sikka 
2015: 160). Th is rose to 100 percent of the FTSE 
by 2019, cementing the Big Four’s control over 
the UK’s auditing market against a background 
of growing calls for radical reform of the indus-
try (Kinder 2019).
In their promotional literature, the Big Four 
oft en portray themselves as ethical organiza-
tions dedicated to transparency and honesty; 
“integrity warriors” (Sampson 2005: 105) en-
gaged in the global fi ght against fraud and cor-
ruption. Th ey are widely seen as “watchdogs of 
the corporate world” (Marriage 2019). But they 
also have a strong interest in creating and ex-
ploiting the market for the kinds of fi nancial 
services they provide. As Sikka (2015: 157) 
observes, they have been “key players in estab-
lishing the post-1970s hegemony and major 
benefi ciaries of the fi nancialisation of the econ-
omy; they have also become adept at bending 
the rules to advance their economic interests.”
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While the Big Four built their reputations 
as professional auditors, they have expanded 
their operations far beyond auditing. Th eir fast-
est growing and most profi table divisions are 
now in non-audit services including tax policy 
compliance and business advising. For exam-
ple, in 2014, the Big Four collectively generated 
GB£8.25 billion in profi t in the UK market, of 
which GB£6.42 billion came from consultancy 
services (Sikka 2015: 157). By 2015, over 60 per-
cent of their total global revenues came from 
non-audit work, compared to less than half 
in 2004 (Agnew 2015). Th is non-audit work 
involved a raft  of legal and fi nancial services 
from risk management, compliance, business 
consulting, and fi nancial planning, to manage-
ment and tax advice. It also included the sale of 
both anti-corruption advice and tax avoidance 
schemes.
As a result of this expansion, the Big Four 
claim to be pioneering a new kind of organi-
zational form that is neither multinational cor-
poration, global partnership, or single fi rm, but 
rather a coordinating entity for a network of 
global affi  liates united around shared “values,” 
“ethics” and “brand” and a common code of 
conduct (KPMG 2015; Shore and Wright 2018). 
Th is new business model was designed to make 
these fi rms more fl exible and more responsive 
to their globalizing clients and better able to 
capture new markets. It has also made them 
more unaccountable and prone to risk-taking 
and fraud. For example, one part of the com-
pany may audit a company’s books while an-
other part advises the same client on strategies 
to avoid tax liabilities. Despite protestations to 
the contrary, this situation inevitably creates 
confl icts of interest. In 2014, PwC was fi ned 
US$25 million and banned for two years from 
consulting work to settle allegations that it had 
watered down an anti-money laundering report 
for the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, while in 2013, 
Deloitte agreed to a one-year suspension to con-
sulting for New York-regulated banks and paid 
US$10 million to settle allegations that the fi rm 
mishandled its anti-money laundering work for 
Standard Chartered (Agnew 2015). 
Similar confl icts of interest were evident in the 
2001 Enron scandal, a company whose accounts 
had been signed off  shortly before its collapse 
by Arthur Andersen—which was also receiving 
fees from Enron for its consulting business. In 
this case, collusion between the company and 
its auditors extended to Anderson “knowingly, 
intentionally and corruptly” inducing employees 
to shred documents in order to obstruct the in-
vestigators (Gledhill 2003: 130). In 2002, the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act was introduced to prevent such 
confl icts of interest arising again by restricting 
auditors from providing consultancy services 
to their audit clients. Th ree of the Big Four re-
sponded by disposing of their consulting arms. 
Deloitte chose not to. However, by the mid-
2000s these agreements had expired, paving the 
way for the fi rms to “rebuild their consulting—
under the guise of ‘advisory’ work—through a 
series of acquisitions” (Agnew 2015). Rebrand-
ing themselves as professional services fi rms has 
enabled the Big Four to take on the work tradi-
tionally carried out by management consultants 
like McKinsey and Boston Consulting Group, 
targeting companies they do not audit, or focus-
ing their eff orts outside the United States where 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not apply.
Consultancy, collusion, and fraud: 
Th e Big Four as brokers
Instead of acting as watchdogs guarding against 
corruption and ensuring high standards of eth-
ical and fi nancial probity, the Big Four have 
increasingly become entangled in collusive 
relations and corruption of their own. Again, 
Mediterraneanist anthropology provides use-
ful parallels. In rural Sicily during the turbulent 
years before the unifi cation of Italy, in order 
to protect their great estates from bandits and 
militant peasants, wealthy landlords increas-
ingly delegated power to local foremen and 
armed bodyguards called gabelloti (Blok 1975: 
32). Th ese entrepreneurial brokers occupied a 
key role mediating between Sicily’s antagonistic 
interest groups—an ideal position from which 
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to cultivate a market in protection and favors. 
As Anton Blok (1975: 94) noted, what was later 
called the Mafi a coincided with these associa-
tions of armed retainers. Like the fi rst private-
ly-recruited “Companies at Arms” tasked with 
policing the countryside, these gabelloti “ex-
torted protection money much like any other 
gang, and acted in collusion with criminals” 
(Mack-Smith 1968: 368–369). Th e success of 
these mafi osi lay in their ability to operate as 
both poachers and gamekeepers.
In the case of the Big Four, the mediating 
position of these fi rms as auditors, brokers, and 
tax advisors also creates confl icts of interest and 
produces spaces for collusion and corruption. 
Much of this has arisen from their develop-
ment and marketing of aggressive tax avoid-
ance schemes. In 2005, a study by Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs (HMRC) concluded that 
the Big Four accounting fi rms were behind al-
most half of all known tax avoidance schemes in 
the UK (Sikka 2015: 158). Th ese fi rms have all 
been mired in high profi le fraud and corruption 
scandals. For example, in 2002, Ernst and Young 
(EY) was ordered to pay the United States Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission US$8.5 mil-
lion for its role in perpetuating a cover up of 
illegal practices for the exercise company Bally 
Total Fitness (Norris 2009). In 2010, the Valukas 
investigation into the Lehman Brothers scandal 
found EY guilty of professional negligence and 
malpractice in the way it had audited the bank’s 
accounts. EY was forced to pay a US$99 mil-
lion settlement for its part in the bank’s demise. 
However, shortly before Lehman Brothers col-
lapsed in 2008, EY had received US$31 million 
in fees (Sikka 2015: 161). Indeed, just before the 
banking crash of 2007–2008, all of the distressed 
banks had been given a clean bill of health from 
their auditors. In 2012, Japanese regulators criti-
cized both EY and KPMG for allowing Olympus 
to operate without proper operational controls, 
enabling the company to carry out a US$1.7 bil-
lion accounting fraud—the largest corruption 
scandal in Japanese corporate history.
Deloitte has also been immersed in similar 
controversies. In one notorious case in 2010 it 
designed a scheme for Deutsche Bank in Lon-
don to enable its staff  to avoid income tax and 
national insurance contributions on bonuses 
amounting to over GB£92 million (US$120.35 
million). It also designed a tax avoidance scheme 
that used a series of transactions in company 
shares, futures and derivatives contracts to 
generate an artifi cial loss and make a client’s 
tax liability vanish (Sikka 2015: 158). In an-
other example, the New York State Department 
of Financial Services in 2012 claimed that De-
loitte has also been complicit in aiding Standard 
Chartered avert the Iranian Sanctions through 
its deliberate failure to report misconduct.
KPMG has an equally checkered history of 
involvement in corruption scandals. In 2009, 
it was sued by the liquidators of New Century 
Financial, the collapsed sub-prime mortgage 
lender, and settled with multiple other organi-
zations including Fannie Mae (Hughes 2009). In 
an earlier case, a 2004 US Senate investigation 
found that “KPMG had engaged in rigorous 
and extensive eff orts to create and sell dozens 
of tax shelters from the mid-1990s until 2003,” 
and had even created “a cold-call centre in Fort 
Wayne, Indiana, for the purposes of aggressively 
selling its tax shelters” (Pai and Tolleson 2012: 
89). In 2005, a US Senate committee found that 
KPMG, PwC, and Ernst and Young had all sold 
fraudulent and illegal tax shelters, but KPMG’s 
admissions of “criminal wrongdoing” were par-
ticularly egregious. As the US Department of 
Justice (2005) declared:
In the largest criminal tax case ever fi led, 
KPMG has admitted that it engaged in a 
fraud that generated at least $11 billion 
dollars in phony tax losses . . . cost the 
United States at least $2.5 billion dollars 
in evaded taxes. . . . KPMG also admitted 
that its personnel took specifi c deliberate 
steps to conceal the existence of the shel-
ters from the IRS.
In 2008, KPMG was forced to pay Xerox 
shareholders US$80 million for its role in ma-
nipulating the company’s accounts. Yet as a US 
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Senate investigation noted, one senior KPMG 
professional had encouraged Xerox to ignore 
IRS rules on registering tax shelters and had 
“coldly calculated” that the penalties for violat-
ing the law would be no greater than $14,000 
per $100,000 in fees that KPMG would collect. 
“For example,” he wrote, “our average . . . deal 
would result in KPMG fees of $360,000 with a 
maximum penalty exposure of only $31,000” 
(Hudson et al. 2014).
If such “cold calculation” is symptomatic 
of the instrumental rationality that drives the 
behavior of these accountancy fi rms, it also il-
lustrates the problem of “moral hazard” behav-
ior that domination of the auditing market by 
the Big Four produces (Coff ee 2005; Pai and 
Tolleson 2012). Th at is, senior accounting pro-
fessionals are incentivized to take ever-greater 
risks in search of huge fees and higher returns 
in the knowledge that the risk of failure will be 
borne not by the partners but by shareholders or 
taxpayers. According to Joel Benjamin (2016), 
the increasing use of Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements (DPEs) that allow fi rms to settle out 
of court by paying a fi ne has compounded this 
problem by reducing incentives for improving 
accounting practices. Th ese factors combined 
with the absence of competition in the market 
for auditing large corporations helps explain 
why, despite government eff orts to police such 
behaviors and regulate these fi rms, the fraud 
and corruption scandals have continued. As 
with Mediterranean patron-clientelism, the be-
havior of auditors is shaped by moral codes that 
are ambiguous and sometimes contradictory.
Collusive practices: 
Th e “revolving-door” phenomenon
Another factor exacerbating problems of cor-
ruption and state capture by corporate and 
fi nancial interests is the increase in “revolving-
door appointments.” Th is term has long been 
used in US politics to describe the way senior 
government offi  cials move from the public to 
the private sector—and vice versa. It is a process 
closely associated with concerns about the col-
lusive relationships that have formed between 
the US government and business, particularly 
in areas like food regulation and defense con-
tracting (Wilks-Heeg 2015: 135). In France, the 
tradition of retiring senior government offi  cials 
taking up lucrative positions in private com-
panies is referred to as pantoufl age (literally, 
putting on slippers), while in Japan a similar 
phenomenon is termed amakundari (descent 
from heaven). In the UK, this phenomenon was 
less common as convention held that civil ser-
vants taking up lucrative appointments in the 
private sector breached public service ethics. 
It was under the Conservative governments 
of the 1980s that all this changed and the re-
volving-door phenomenon became normal-
ized. Th is began with Mrs. Th atcher’s program 
to bring the state and business closer together 
and was extended under Tony Blair’s New La-
bour government. Since 2008, dozens of former 
ministers and senior civil servants have left  gov-
ernment posts for jobs with the Big Four. Diplo-
mats seem to be in particular demand and Tony 
Blair himself, upon retirement as prime minis-
ter, combined being “Middle East envoy” with 
a GB£2.5 million per year (US$3.27 million) 
advisory role with JPMorgan Chase (Gapper 
2013). 
Th e story of Dave Hartnett, former head 
of tax at Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
(HMRC), is illustrative of the revolving-door 
phenomenon in the UK. Under Hartnett’s 
leadership, HMRC struck several highly con-
troversial deals that allowed Starbucks and 
Vodafone to avoid paying billions in owed 
corporation tax. Deloitte was heavily involved 
in Vodafone’s acquisition of the German tele-
coms operator Mannesman. Between 2006 and 
2010, Hartnett held at least 47 meetings with 
Deloitte’s UK Chairman, David Cruikshank, 
to resolve Vodafone’s dispute with HMRC, 
which resulted in a lump sum settlement pay-
ment of just GB£800,000 (US$1,046,536) and a 
further GB£450,000 (US$588,676) spread over 
fi ve years. A year aft er his retirement in 2013, 
Hartnett joined Deloitte as a specialist advisor 
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(Sikka 2015: 158–159). Similarly, Hector Sant, 
head of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) 
and responsible for regulating banks until 2012, 
joined Barclays six months aft er retiring. In the 
same year, Margaret Cole, ex-head of enforce-
ment of the FSA, became General Council of 
PwC. But this pales in comparison with the 
movement of former government ministers into 
lucrative positions with the health, defense, or 
building companies they dealt with while in of-
fi ce (Brooks and Hughes 2016). As in rural Sic-
ily, a new class of gamekeeper-turned-poachers 
has colonized the opportunity spaces created by 
these new and emerging markets in manage-
ment consultancy.
It is not only aft er retirement that such col-
lusive relationships develop either; the revolv-
ing door between private accountancy fi rms 
and the state is expanding in other ways too, as 
the story of Brian Sweet illustrates. Sweet was 
an Associate Director at the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), a US 
regulatory agency in charge of examining ac-
counting fi rms for defi ciencies in their audits. 
In 2014, a PCAOB report on its inspections of 
KPMG audits showed that 23 out of 50 audits (or 
46 percent) were defi cient. One of KPMGs mea-
sures to improve its results was to hire Sweet—
previously responsible for conducting internal 
inspections of KPMG audits—as a partner in 
its Department of Professional Practice Group. 
Before joining KPMG, Sweet allegedly “copied 
from an internal PCAOB database to his of-
fi ce computer various confi dential inspection-
related materials he believed might help him at 
KPMG” (Levine 2018). Th is included the con-
fi dential list of KPMG audits the PCAOB were 
planning to inspect in 2015. 
Big Four advisors are oft en seconded to the 
UK Treasury or HMRC to work on tax legis-
lation and then use that experience to develop 
ways to help their corporate clients avoid paying 
taxes (Sikka 2015). A 2013 House of Commons 
Public Accounts Committee (PAC) enquiry into 
tax avoidance highlights this problem. Giving 
evidence to the committee, one former senior 
PwC employee admitted that it was PwC pol-
icy to sell tax avoidance schemes that had “as 
little as a 50 percent chance of succeeding if 
challenged in court” (HoC 2013: 3). In short, 
schemes that PwC knew had a high probabil-
ity of being deemed unlawful. Th e enquiry 
concluded that the government was “fi ghting 
a battle it cannot win” against tax avoidance 
(HoC 2013: 3). Companies can devote huge re-
sources to minimize their tax liability and the 
Big Four, who earned over GB£15 billion in UK 
income alone in 2018, had 250 transfer pricing 
specialists between them, whereas HMRC had 
only 65 (Financial Director 2018). Launching 
the report, Chairperson Margaret Hodge (2013) 
summed up the problem:
Th e large accountancy fi rms are in a pow-
erful position in the tax world and have 
an unhealthily cosy relationship with 
government. Th ey second staff  to the 
Treasury to advise on formulating tax 
legislation. 
 When those staff  return to their fi rms, 
they have the very inside knowledge and 
insight to be able to identify loopholes in 
the new legislation and advise their cli-
ents on how to take advantage of them. 
Th e poacher, turned gamekeeper for a 
time, returns to poaching.
 Th is is a ridiculous confl ict of interest 
which should be banned in a code of con-
duct for tax advisers, as we have recom-
mended to the Treasury and HMRC.
Yet this revolving door phenomenon is not 
corruption per se, despite the fact it clearly in-
volves the (ab)use of public offi  ce for private 
gain. Weakening public-sector controls and 
blurring the public-private boundary undoubt-
edly increases the likelihood of corruption and 
the risk that private interests may colonize key 
areas of public life. Some MPs lament that the 
Big Four are now “more powerful than govern-
ment” (Hudson et al. 2014). Evidence suggests 
this pattern of state-sponsored revolving doors 
is rife in other areas of government resulting in 
widespread regulatory capture (Pai and Tolleson 
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2012). Again, useful insights can be gleaned 
from Mediterranean patron-clientelism, par-
ticularly anthropological studies of the Sicilian 
mafi a (cosa nostra), an organization adept at 
state capture, bridging class divides, and mo-
bilizing patrons to maximize private gain (J. 
Schneider and P. Schneider 2003b). Regulatory 
capture, whether in Sicily or London, poses a 
serious threat to democracy.
Conclusion: Big Four, moral hazard, and 
the political economy of 
fi nancial corruption 
What do these examples illustrate about the 
nature of contemporary corruption as an an-
thropological phenomenon? Returning to the 
questions posed at the outset, the spread of cor-
ruption in the Global North, particularly in its 
more developed fi nancial sectors, has undoubt-
edly been exacerbated by policies of deregula-
tion, outsourcing, and marketization. As James 
Ferguson (2010: 172) argues, neoliberalism 
“puts governmental mechanisms developed in 
the private sphere to work within the state it-
self, so that even core functions of the state are 
either subcontracted out to private providers, or 
run (as the saying has it) ‘like a business.’” How-
ever, business ethics and public service norms 
are oft en incompatible. Far from reducing cor-
ruption, the growth of audit culture appears to 
increase the conditions for its existence, under-
mining the state’s regulatory role and producing 
new opportunities for the predatory interests 
of fi nance capital. Th e oligopolistic nature of 
the auditing services market creates a situation 
whereby government regulators, particularly 
since Arthur Anderson collapsed, are reluctant 
to indict any of the Big Four for criminal actions 
for fear that another collapse would simply re-
sult in further concentration of power in the 
remaining “Big Th ree.” Th e argument that these 
fi rms are “too big to fail” and “too concentrated 
to indict” exacerbates moral hazard behavior 
and gives the Big Four a curious kind of legal 
immunity (Pai and Tolleson 2012: 89). 
As with Mediterranean patron-clientelism 
and corruption, the rise in accountancy scandals 
refl ects a new political economy of corruption, 
one that involves the major fi nancial industry 
actors—including banks, credit rating agencies 
and auditing fi rms—colluding with govern-
ment offi  cials and political elites. New kinds of 
“fl exible networks” and forms of “dirty togeth-
erness” (Wedel 2009) emerge as accountancy 
experts and offi  cials move along the revolv-
ing doors between private business and their 
public regulators. What, therefore, is diff erent 
about contemporary corporate corruption and 
its seemingly more traditional Mediterranean 
counterpart? Both entail an “unhealthily close 
relationship” between government and power-
ful, strategically placed individuals, and both 
refl ect forms of domination that are rarely per-
ceived in terms of class power. Th e similarities 
are instructive. As Jane and Peter Schneider 
(2003b) noted, there were signifi cant overlaps 
between the “business subcultures” of Enron 
and the Sicilian mafi a. Mafi a’s membership was 
through “selective recruitment and integra-
tion into the ‘fraternity’ through initiation rites 
and sponsorship by an older, oft en charismatic 
‘boss.’” It also entailed
the systematic “conditioning” of well-
placed persons in important institutions, 
especially the state, through gratuitous 
hospitality and favor-granting; and gener-
ous provision of clients throughout soci-
ety. Th is cluster of practices goes hand in 
hand with the mafi a’s representation of it-
self as an honored society, a self-anointed 
elite, superior to normal people and ex-
empt from normal rules. (Schneider and 
Schneider 2003b: 137)
Flouting the rules and a pervasive sense of 
being part of a superior elite are also key ele-
ments in the business subculture of leading 
banks and fi nancial institutions, as anthropolo-
gist and Financial Times columnist Gillian Tett 
(2009) has shown. Yet while comparisons with 
patron-client relations are instructive, they are 
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perhaps less useful for understanding class rela-
tions at institutional levels. For example, when 
employing accountancy fi rms, government ap-
pears as neither fully “client” nor fully “patron.” 
Th is is also true for the Big Four. Th e consul-
tants, politicians, and businesspeople who pop-
ulate the world of accountancy are part of an 
elite group, but relationships between them are 
not necessarily voluntaristic, face-to-face or 
moral. Senior accountants are also unlikely to 
have intimate relationships with their poorer 
clients, especially where years of state under-
funding and austerity have enlarged the social 
distance between them. Th at said, the revolving 
door phenomenon does eff ectively remove the 
tension between the private sector and the state 
that is supposed to treat it objectively, creating 
shared interests if not shared identity. As Rich-
ard Brooks and Solomon Hughes state:
Both sectors end up employing the same 
people and they think the same way. No 
part of government now questions the 
market in public services. . . . Perhaps 
more even than lobbying and hospitality, 
the revolving door creates the uniformity 
of thinking between gamekeeper and 
poacher, purchaser and provider or even 
regulator and the regulated, that invari-
ably ends in disasters, up to and including 
the fi nancial crisis. (2016: 6)
What we may be witnessing here is also the 
emergence of a new kind of class formation. 
Similar processes of political economy that cre-
ated the conditions for the expansion of pro-
fessional auditing companies—including their 
excessive risk-taking behavior, the aggressive 
pursuit of new markets and the expansion of 
new technologies of measurement to improve 
effi  ciency and returns on investment—have 
also fueled the rise of audit culture (Shore and 
Wright 2015). Th e Big Four are both cause and 
eff ect of this growth. Contrary to their image as 
integrity warriors dedicated to ensuring probity 
and trust, commercial interest and fi nancial 
calculation are central to the way they operate. 
In this respect, the Big Four and the auditing 
industry itself may be part of the problem for 
which they claim to be the solution.
Th is raises another link with Mediterra-
neanist anthropology. Th e claim traditionally 
made in defense of patron-clientelism was that 
it helped “bridge the gap” between peripheral 
communities and the urban centers. Patrons 
were “community-nation mediators” (Silver-
man 1965) who interceded on behalf of their cli-
ents to help them access resources. Yet far from 
closing that gap, it was in the material interests 
of these brokers to maintain it. In a similar 
vein, the Big Four have created an extraordi-
narily powerful niche for themselves as brokers 
and mediators between private companies, the 
state, and the world of fi nance. Accountants do 
a valuable job, but as Sikka argues, “excessive re-
liance on accounting has not given us freedom 
from fraud or produced ethical and responsi-
ble corporate conduct. If anything, accounting 
fi rms have undermined national tax revenues 
and used their expertise to excel at money laun-
dering, bribery, corruption and other antisocial 
practices” (2009).
Th ese comments invite further comparisons 
with the mafi a, an organization that excelled 
in money laundering, bribery, and corruption; 
mobilized their cultural and entrepreneurial 
resources to promote themselves; and champi-
oned a particular kind of business ethic that was 
oft en cast in the idiom of public service (Arlac-
chi 1986; Schneider and Schneider 2003a). Th ey 
also carved out a successful niche in the spaces 
between private enterprise and the public 
sphere. Jane and Peter Schneider (2003b: 140) 
pose the question of “whether organised crime, 
extortion and illegal traffi  cking are not full-
fl edged elements of the workings of capitalism, 
as such.” Th is seems to be the case. If the Sicilian 
mafi a off ers useful points of comparison, it also 
helps us to recognize that while these collusive 
networks, regulatory capture, and instrumental 
logics of accountancy may constitute a new type 
of class formation and power elite, these pro-
cesses nevertheless have signifi cant and well-
documented historical precedents. 
Audit failure and corporate corruption | 13
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Dorothy Zinn and Jutta 
Lauth Bacas for organizing the panel on corrup-
tion and Mediterranean anthropology where 
an earlier version of this article was presented. 
I also wish to thank the two anonymous review-
ers for their helpful suggestions for strengthen-
ing the article’s argument and analysis.
Cris Shore is professor of Anthropology at 
Goldsmiths University of London. His research 
explores issues in contemporary political an-
thropology including European integration, 
university reform, and audit culture. His areas of 
specialization include the anthropology of pol-
icy, Europe, organizational ethnography, cor-
ruption, and higher education. He is author and 
editor of 15 books including Building Europe: 
Th e Cultural Politics of European Integration 
(Routledge, 2000); Corruption: Anthropological 
Perspectives (Pluto: 2005); Policy Worlds: An-
thropology and the Analysis of Contemporary 
Power (Berghahn, 2011), and Th e Shapeshift ing 
Crown: Locating the State in Postcolonial Austra-
lia, Canada, New Zealand and the United King-
dom (Cambridge University Press, 2019). 
Email: c.shore@gold.ac.uk
Notes
 1. In the UK, government support for the banks 
between 2007 and 2010 was GB£1,162 billion 
(National Audit Offi  ce 2017).
 2. Since the Enron scandal in 2001, however, some 
organizations such as Transparency Interna-
tional have broadened their defi nition of cor-
ruption to the “abuse of entrusted power.”
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